Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1

Article 7

12-1-1956

Legislation and Administration: Constitutional
Law -- Due Process -- Amended Regulations of the
Coast Guard Port Security Program
George A. Patterson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
George A. Patterson, Legislation and Administration: Constitutional Law -- Due Process -- Amended Regulations of the Coast Guard Port
Security Program, 32 Notre Dame L. Rev. 153 (1956).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol32/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

-

TIONS OF ME COAST GuARi

DuE PROCESS AMENDED REGULAPORT SECURITY PROGRAM. - Amended

security regulations of the Coast Guard covering seamen and those
persons seeking access to waterfront facilities became effective
May 1, 1956. 21 FED. REG. 2814 (1956) (Security of Vessels),
amending 33 C.F.R. § 121 (Supp. 1955); 21 FED. REG. 2940 (1956)
(Security of Waterfront Facilities), amending 33 C.F.R. § 125
(Supp. 1955). These new regulations are the results of an effort to
align the procedures of the Coast Guard port security program
with the decision in Parkerv. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
N. Y. Times, April 26, 1956, p. 1, col. 4.
Authority of the Coast Guard to conduct a security screening
program for persons privately employed is derived from the Magnuson Act, 64 STAT. 427 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1952) and Exec.
Order No. 10173, 3 C.F.R. 140 (Supp. 1950) (later amended by
Exec. Order No. 10277, 3 C.F.R. 460 (Supp. 1951) and Exec. Order
No. 10352, 3 C.F.R. 77 (Supp. 1952)).
Under both the former and the amended regulations, a seaman
must obtain security clearance from the Commandant of the Coast
Guard if he seeks employment on a merchant vessel. In addition,
any other person who seeks access to a waterfront facility which
the Commandant has declared to be an area to which the security
regulations apply must obtain security clearance. The Parkercase
arose when seamen who were denied clearance complained that
the procedures employed in determining their status, pursuant to
33 C.F.R. § 121 (Supp. 1955), violated requirements of due process, and sought an injunction to prevent their enforcement. The
plaintiffs maintained that they had been deprived of the right to
follow their chosen occupation, which right was recognized in
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915), and that their right to notice
and a hearing under the Fifth Amendment had been denied.
The court drew the lines of conflict by saying, "... [W]e must
weigh against the rights of the individual to the traditional opportunity for notice and hearing, the public need for a screening system which denies such right to notice and hearing," 227 F.2d at
718, and by criticizing as too strong the statement of the trial court
that "... [O]pportunity for confrontation and cross-examination
of adverse witnesses cannot be afforded a petitioner in these situtions without destroying the security program."
Relief was granted the seamen, the court stating that the regulations as framed and operated fell short of the minimum requirements of due process. The court's principal objections were: (1)
(153)
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the regulations did not provide for notice or hearing prior to a
denial of clearance; (2) the notice required if the applicant appealed from a denial of his clearance was not sufficiently specific to disclose the source of data nor the identity of persons forwarding information; (3) the regulations did not provide sufficient opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.
The amended regulations satisfy the first objection since provision is made for notice to the applicant and for a hearing prior
to an effective adverse decision on the application. 21 FED. REG.
2815 § 121.07 (b), 2816 § 121.11 (e) (1956); 21 FED. REG. 2942
§§ 125.31 (b), 125.35 (e) (1956).
The second objection is countered in the amended regulations,
21 FED. REG. 2816 § 1 21.11 (a) (1956) and 21 FED. REG. 2942 §
125.35 (a) (1956), with the following:
Such notice shall be as specific and detailed as the interests of
national security shall permit and shall include pertinent information such as names, dates, and places in such detail as to permit
reasonable answer.
The standard for the degree of disclosure, "... as specific and
detailed as the interests of national security shall permit .. .," can

hardly be improved, inasmuch as provision for national security
must be made. For another nearly identical standard, see the recently promulgated regulations of the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion. 21 FED. REG. 3106 § 4.22 (b) (1956). For a suggested and more
liberal standard, see REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE AssoCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK

162 (1956).

Notwithstanding the suitability of the standard, it is questionable whether the "minimum requirements of due process" are met.
Although the amended regulations go farther toward assuring
the applicant that he will receive detailed information, they do not
specify who will decide what information shall be disclosed, except to name the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 21 FED. REG.
2815 § 121.07 (b) (1956); 21 FED. REG. 2942 § 125.31 (b) (1956).
The court in Parker v. Lester, supra, spoke of possible arbitrary
and capricious withholding of information. 227 F.2d at 722. Assurance of fair use of the standard for disclosure should be a simple
matter; at least, the Atomic Energy Commission security procedures more specifically denote who shall approve the notification
letter; i.e., the Division of Security, AEC, the Office of the General Counsel and the Manager of Operations (signatory). 21 FED.
REG. 3106 § 4.22.
The amended regulations would not seem to satisfy the third
objection of the court. The rights of confrontation and cross-exam-
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ination are hardly more than acknowledged in the amended regulations, 21 FED. REG. 2816 § 121.19 (f), (g) (1956); 21 FED. REG.
2943 § 125.43 (f), (g) (1956):
Every effort shall be made to produce material witnesses to testify
in support of the reasons set forth in the Notice of the Commandant,
in order that such witnesses may be confronted and cross-examined
by the applicant....

The applicant has no subpoena power, nor has the hearing board.
With no provisions to force confrontation of any witness, the
amended provisions do not substantially differ from those criticized by the court. Moreover, it is clear that greater concessions
may be made to have witnesses appear, at least before hearing
boards if not before the applicant, without jeopardizing the security program. See 21 FED. REG. 3107 § 4.27 (m) (1956) (Atomic
Energy Commission security clearance procedure); cf. REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcuRITY
PROGRAM OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW

Yox 174 (1956).
The new regulations cannot yet be scrutinized in the light of
Supreme Court decisions, as that body has thus far declined to
consider the constitutional issues here involved. Peters v. Hobby,
349 U. S. 331, 338 (1955). However, the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas is noteworthy, 349 U. S. at 352:
If the sources of information need protection, they should be kept
secret. But once they are used to destroy a man's reputation and
deprive him of his 'liberty', they must be put to the test of due

process of law.
Following circuit court affirmance of its decision in the Parker
case, the federal district court issued an injunction directing the
Coast Guard to issue the necessary sailing papers at once to those
mariners who had been refused previously as security risks under
the former security rules. These men could be screened later
under the amended rules, but their papers could not be held up
until then. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1956, p. 32, col. 4. The Government immediately sought a stay of the injunction, but the petition
was denied in Lester v. Parker, 235 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1956). If
the Government further appeals its petition, ensuing litigation
in the Parker case may develop an opportunity to assay the
amended security clearance procedures of the Coast Guard.
Eugene F. Waye
CRIMINAL

LAw-PARENTAL

RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY IMPOSED BY NEW YORK STATUTE.--On July 1, 1956,
an amendment to the Children's Court Act of the State of New
York and an amendment to the New York City Domestic Rela-
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tions Court Act became effective, thus setting in motion another
procedure for combatting juvenile delinquency in that state. By
the provisions of these new amendments, when a child is
adjudged delinquent the judge may issue a written order
specifying conduct to be followed by the "parent or parents,
custodian or other persons having custody of the child. .. .
The conduct specified must be such as would reasonably prevent
the delinquency of the child; and a person who receives such
an order and wilfully violates it commits criminal contempt of
court. The persons charged with contempt are to be notified,
and afforded a reasonable time to prepare a defense. The trial
for contempt is not heard by the same judge who issued the
prior order. Conviction is made punishable "by fine, not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment, not
exceeding thirty days, in the jail of the county where the court
is sitting, or both, in the discretion of the court. . . " N.Y.
§ 22 (h); N.Y.C. DoM. REL. CT. ACT § 83 (i).

CmLDmN's CT. ACT

This amendment embodies a new method of combatting juvenile
delinquency-not because it places responsibility for delinquent
acts on the parents, for parental responsibility statutes have
been in use in the United States since 1903, Gladstone, Spare
the Rod and Spoil the Parent, 19 FED. PROBATION 3 (1955) -but
because it embodies the use of the contempt of court procedure
as its means of enforcement. Further, it makes only wilful
violations punishable, and it provides a procedure whereby those
responsible are adequately warned of their responsibilities before any court action can be taken against them.
Prior to the passage of this amendment, the parental responsibility statutes have simply made it a crime punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both for a parent to contribute to the neglect or
delinquency of his child. New York is among the states to have
enacted such a statute, N.Y. PEN. LAw § 494; in fact, a recent
study indicates that all but two states, Delaware and Vermont,
now have this type of criminal statute. LuDWIG, YOUTH AND THE
LAW 137 (1955). These criminal statutes are very broad. A
majority of them impose liability on the parents not only for
intentional contributions to the child's delinquency, but also for
negligence, and some go so far as to hold the parents strictly liable although there is no parental fault in the traditional criminal
law sense. These statutes are not uniform concerning requirement of a prior adjudication of the child's delinquency before
action may be taken against the parent. Some states require
this adjudication while others do not. Ludwig, id. at 153-167. A
further distinction lies in that some of these statutes "punish
anyone who contributes to the delinquency of a minor... [while]

1956]

LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION

others require that the accused stand in position of 'loco
parentis'." Vehar, Admissibility of Violations of Law by Child
as Evidence In Prosecution of Parents for Criminal Neglect,
7 Wyo. L. J. 133, 136 (1953). When these statutes were enacted
it was thought that they would have to be nearly all inclusive
to be effective; yet it is their broadness which has prompted much
of the adverse comment concerning them. The criticism largely
has been aimed at those statutes which hold the parents liable
for negligent contributions to delinquency and those which hold
the parents strictly liable. One critic stated his views thusly:
Punishment as a method of control of that great bulk of delinquent

parents whose contributing consists mainly of omission-failure to
to teach, train, and supervise the child from the cradle on up--is so
impracticable as to be worthless, and it appears quite useless to

attempt it. Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents?, 12
FED. PROBATION 23, 28 (1948).
Statistics seem to indicate that these statutes have not been as
effective a deterrent of juvenile delinquency as their sponsors
anticipated. On page ten of the REPORT oF THE NEW YORK STATE
TEMPORARY CoMMIssIoN ON YOUTH AND DELINQUENCY (1955), the
report of the commission which recommended the new contempt
amendment, it is stated that between 1948 and 1954 there was a
58 per cent increase in cases disposed of by children's courts
throughout the nation while the total juvenile population increased during the same period by 13 per cent. It should be remembered
that this increase occurred when there were parental responsibility statutes in a great majority of the states.
Before the passage of this amendment, the state of New York
had one of the broadest type of parental responsibility statutes,
yet it also witnessed an increase in juvenile delinquency. Though
the New York state juvenile delinquency increase was not as great
as the national average, the need for a reappraisal of existing legislation concerning juvenile delinquency was felt to be imminent.
Therefore, the New York State Temporary Commission on Youth
and Delinquency was established to study the problem and make
legislative recommendations. In the report of the temporary commission one of the statutes referred to was section 494 of the New
York Penal Law when it stated, "Present statutes are unsuitable
because of their vagueness, spasmodic invocation and the occasional harshness of their penalties." REPORT, Op. cit. supra, at 20
(1955). On July 10, 1956, in a letter to the writer discussing section 494 of the New York Penal Law and its relation to the new
contempt amendment, Mr. Mark A. McCloskey, chairman of the
New York State Youth Commission, stated:
Some law enforcement agencies hesitate to proceed under section
494 of the Penal Law because it is difficult in certain cases to prove
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the connection between the act or omission on the part of a parent,
guardian or other person and the juvbnile delinquency of the child.
...Under the new law it will only be necessary to prove that a
written order was issued by the judge specifying conduct to be
followed by the parent, guardian or other persons having custody
of the child and that such reasonable order or orders were violated.

When it passed the amendment, the New York State Legislature
did not repeal section 494 of the Penal Law. Thus, as Mr. McCloskey further pointed out in his letter of July 10, it will be
possible now for law enforcement agencies in New York to proceed under the new law or under section 494 of the Penal Law.
By the enactment of this new amendment, it seems that the
legislature of the state of New York has taken a well directed step
forward in its continuous effort to curb youthful delinquency. The
amendment seems to embody sound theory and there should be
ample opportunity for its use, since "in the cases of delinquent or
neglected children disposed of after investigations by the court's
Probation Bureau (Domestic Relations Court of New York City)
approximately 75% of the children were returned to the homes
from which they had come." Punishing Parents in The Children's Courts, 30 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 318 (1956). Whatever may
be expected of this new amendment, it does not seem that it can
be expected to be a panacea for the problem of juvenile delinquency; for legislation can merely point up the responsibility of
parenthood; it cannot be expected to take the place of the love and
training which should be given the child in the home, the church,
and thp school. As one writer aptly stated, "Progress will be made
in preventing delinquency when all the resources of the community are utilized to help the child and the parents." Gladstone,
Spare the Rod and Spoil the Parent,19 FED. PROBATION 3, 39
(1955) (Emphasis added.)
George A. Patterson

